EXPERIENTIAL STRUCTURALISM AND NEO‐PIAGETIAN THEORIES: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL

Abstract

Experiential structuralism is a new theory of cognitive organization and growth. It postulates that the cognitive system is organized into six autonomous capacity spheres: the quantitative‐relational, the qualitative‐analytic, the imaginal‐spatial, the causal‐experimental, the verbal‐propositional, and the metacognitive‐reflecting. These capacities were called experiential because they are experimentally documented, they reflect the organization of the persons' experience and the ‐ subjective ‐ experience the persons have about this organization. Thus it was proposed that a set of specific cognitive abilities may be integrated into a general capacity under the guidance of four principles. Namely, the principles of (1) domain specificity, (2) formal‐procedural specificity, (3) symbolic bias, and (4) subjective distinctness of capacities. It was argued that this theory resolves some of the problems related to the competence‐performance dispute better than the other neo‐Piagetian theories. It seems to succeed in this regard because it postulates mechanisms directly linking performance variations with systematic variations in the organization of the cognitive system. However, the neo‐Piagetian theories, though they did not define capacities, did propose notions able to causally explain the construction of autonomous capacities. These notions were integrated into a common model able to explain the generation of capacities. Overall, then, the present article attempts to integrate traditional differential and cognitive‐developmental psychology into a common theory.

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