Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy

Ian Down

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

Analyses of central bank independence (CBI) have generated two sets of apparently contradictory results - CBI appears to be both inversely related to inflation and positively related to the rise in unemployment and slowdown in economic growth during disinflations. I suggest that these results may issue from autonomous central banks being associated with sharper, more aggressive disinflations. To test the proposition I use two measures of policy stance, one of which contains more information concerning policymaker's expectations than has heretofore been the case. The results suggest a need to qualify yet further the optimality of CBI.

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References

1993Discretion versus policy rules in practice 1999The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective 1998Monetary policy rules in practice 1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 1999Monetary Policy Rules 1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 1993Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence 2001Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence

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