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Reply to Berger and Woitek
7 references·6 citing·36 second hop
Reply to Berger and Woitek (1997)Reply to Berger and WoitekThe bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence (1997)The bureaucratic and partisan…How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis (1997)How opportunistic are partisa…A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles (1997)A model of partisan central b…FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY (1996)FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELEC…Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik: 1950-1983 (1989)Der Sozialstaat in der Bundes…Politico-economic models and cycles (1978)Politico-economic models and …Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy (1977)Political Parties and Macroec…Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021) (2021)Independence, conservatism, a…Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries (2019)Government ideology and monet…The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation - an Empirical Analysis (2005)The Educational and Professio…The future of the euro: a public choice perspective (2003)The future of the euro: a pub…The German political business cycle: money demand rather than monetary policy (2001)The German political business…Political Culture and the Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence (1999)Political Culture and the Pol…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence (1993)Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability (1998)The role of a regional bank in a system of central banks (1999)The Political Business Cycle (1975)The federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission (1989)Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)RATIONAL PARTISAN THEORY, UNCERTAINTY, AND SPATIAL VOTING: EVIDENCE FOR THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S MPC (2009)Party politics and the survival of central bank governors (2013)Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey (2017)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (1992)Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009)Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries (2011)Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936)Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control (1977)The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme (1995)The New Politics of the Welfare State (2001)Trust and Growth (2001)Expectations and the neutrality of money (1972)Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries (1999)A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents (2001)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964 (1971)The public choice view of international political economy (1984)Government partisanship in Western democracies, 1945–1998 (2002)Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2003)Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles (1988)Econometric policy evaluation: A critique (1976)Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Wohlfahrtspluralismus — Analytische und normativ-politische Dimensionen eines Leitbegriffs (1996)Explaining the introduction of automatic pension indexation provisions in 17 OECD countries, 1945–2000 (2012)Business and Welfare State Development: Why Did Employers Accept Social Reforms? (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy3,367 cited
  • 1978Politico-economic models and cycles167 cited
  • 1989Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik: 1950-1983118 cited
  • 1997The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence112 cited
  • 1997How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis52 cited
  • 1997A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles48 cited
  • 1996FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY37 cited

Cited by

  • 2003The future of the euro: a public choice perspective28 cited
  • 2001The German political business cycle: money demand rather than monetary policy24 cited
  • 2021Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)19 cited
  • 2019Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries18 cited
  • 1999Political Culture and the Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence17 cited
  • 2005The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation - an Empirical Analysis15 cited

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