Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments

Abstract

The paper surveys political macroeconomics, covering its development from Rogoff’s conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design. Topics include the inflation‐stabilization trade‐off, central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs, inflation targets, performance contracts for monetary authorities, and the consequences of output persistence for these issues. Further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent, the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy, the government spending bias, and the game‐theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. All work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework.

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