Modeling, Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games

Abstract

Consider a networked evolutionary game (NEG). According to its strategy updating rule, a fundamental evolutionary equation (FEE) for each node is proposed, which is based on local information. Using FEEs, the network strategy profile dynamics (SPD) is expressed as a k-valued (deterministic or probabilistic) logical dynamic system. The SPD is then used to analyze the network dynamic behaviors, such as the fixed points, the cycles, and the basins of attractions, etc. Particularly, when the homogeneous networked games are considered, a necessary and sufficient condition is presented to verify when a stationary stable profile exists. Then the equivalence of two NEGs is investigated. Finally, after a rigorous definition of controlled NEGs, some control problems, including controllability, stabilization, and network consensus, are considered, and some verifiable conditions are presented. Examples with various games are presented to illustrate the theoretical results. The basic tool for this approach is the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, which is a generalization of the conventional matrix product.

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