Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion

Dwight R. Lee · Fred S. McChesney

300 citations0/0 files storedSouthern Economic Journal

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Corruption and Economic Development Taxation and Compliance Studies Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

Introduction The Model 1. Background: The Economic Theory of Regulation 2. Rent Extraction: The Theory of Political Extortion Demonstrations 3.Observing Extortion: The Practice of Rent Extraction 4. Validating the Model: Empirical Tests of Rent Extraction 5. Contracting for Rent Preservation: The Durability Problem Extensions 6. Extraction and Optimal Taxation: Excises, Earmarked Taxes, and Government User Charges 7. Costs and Benefits of Interest-Group Organization 8. Improving the Model: Worthy Yet Unanswered Questions Notes References Index

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