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Arif Ahmed

13 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

The article discusses a well-known type of counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT), in which CDT recommends an option that probably causes the best outcome while itself being evidence that it causes the worst. Intuition disagrees. Many philosophers accept that this justifies either modifying CDT or dropping it altogether. I argue to the contrary that (a) if intuition is right about this case, then transitivity of preference must be violated in another, but (b) this violation is untenable. I conclude that CDT stands.

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References

1969Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel 1978Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory 2007Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory 2007No Regrets, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory 1994Foundations of Rational Choice under Risk.2011Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem

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2020Rational monism and rational pluralism 2020Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists 2019Normative Decision Theory 2023Decision Theory without Luminosity 2015Egan and agents: How evidential decision theory can deal with Egan’s dilemma 2021Escaping the Cycle

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