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In-between Believing
2 references·16 citing·45 second hop
In-between Believing (2001)In-between BelievingA Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief (2002)A Phenomenal, Dispositional A…From folk psychology to cognitive science (1983)From folk psychology to cogni…Why Double-Check? (2022)Why Double-Check?If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It (2018)If You Can't Change What You …Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science (2017)Against dispositionalism: bel…Disbelief in belief: On the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs (2016)Disbelief in belief: On the c…The Irrelevance of Legitimacy (2015)The Irrelevance of LegitimacyDelusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings (2015)Delusions, Acceptances, and C…When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion (2014)When Words Speak Louder than …Iteration and Fragmentation (2014)Iteration and FragmentationBelief through Thick and Thin (2013)Belief through Thick and ThinA Dispositional Theory of Love (2013)A Dispositional Theory of LoveA Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box (2013)A Dispositional Approach to A…Knowledge entails dispositional belief (2012)Knowledge entails disposition…A puzzle about epistemic akrasia (2012)A puzzle about epistemic akra…In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions (2011)In Defence of Modest Doxastic…Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias” (2011)Comments on Gendler’s, “the e…Knowing Your Own Beliefs (2009)Knowing Your Own BeliefsCollected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (1935)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)The Concept of Mind (2006)Knowledge and suberogatory assertion (2013)Could KK Be OK? (2014)True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness. (2017)How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)The Dappled World (1999)Explaining delusions: a cognitive perspective (2006)ACTING CONTRARY TO OUR PROFESSED BELIEFS OR THE GULF BETWEEN OCCURRENT JUDGMENT AND DISPOSITIONAL BELIEF (2010)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)Knowing That P without Believing That P (2013)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality (2015)Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure (2019)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Nothing at Stake in Knowledge* (2017)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)The second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability (2007)Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For (2015)Higher order ignorance inside the margins (2018)On Believing (2022)Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984)Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (2007)Explaining Imagination (2020)Explaining Imagination (2020)Do Large Language Models Know What Humans Know? (2023)A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957)A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (2017)Perceptual Pluralism (2019)Mental Imagery (2023)The Intentional Stance (1987)Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises (1998)Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2001)Belief’s minimal rationality (2019)Delusional evidence-responsiveness (2021)The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (1966)Construal-level theory of psychological distance. (2010)The theory of communicative action (2014)A comparative study of legitimation strategies in hybrid regimes (2016)Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood (2018)The Rise and Fall of Political Orders (2018)Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis (1988)Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory (1992)A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation (1994)
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References

  • 1983From folk psychology to cognitive science935 cited
  • 2002A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief547 cited

Cited by

  • 2017Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science182 cited
  • 2012A puzzle about epistemic akrasia173 cited
  • 2013Belief through Thick and Thin147 cited
  • 2013A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box142 cited
  • 2018If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It129 cited
  • 2012Knowledge entails dispositional belief115 cited
  • 2014Iteration and Fragmentation102 cited
  • 2015The Irrelevance of Legitimacy94 cited
  • 2022Why Double-Check?91 cited
  • 2011Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias”76 cited
  • 2015Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings64 cited
  • 2014When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion61 cited
  • 2016Disbelief in belief: On the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs60 cited
  • 2011In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions

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54 cited
  • 2013A Dispositional Theory of Love47 cited
  • 2009Knowing Your Own Beliefs46 cited