WHY HOLD‐UPS OCCUR: THE SELF‐ENFORCING RANGE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

Unknown author

543 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Legal principles and applications Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

Court enforcement and private enforcement are not alternative contract enforcement mechanisms, but are used jointly by transactors to define the self‐enforcing range of a contractual relationship. Within this framework contract terms economize on the limited amounts of private enforcement capital possessed by transactors, either by directly controlling transactor behavior or by shifting private enforcement capital between transactors to coincide with likely future market conditions. Hold‐ups occur when market conditions change sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self‐enforcing range. This probabilistic view of hold‐ups is contrasted with opportunism more generally and with moral hazard behavior.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 543 citations exist upstream.

References

1979Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations 1976Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems 1978Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process 1973Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud 1981The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance 1990Corporate culture and economic theory 1987The theory of contracts 1993The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud

Cited by

2009Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects 2014Vertical Integration and Input Flows 2007The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy 2006Friends, Businesspeople, and Relationship Roles: A Conceptual Framework and a Research Agenda 2009Determinants of Partner Opportunism in Strategic Alliances: A Conceptual Framework 2004

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.