Article2011

Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Visual perception and processing mechanisms Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms are fundamentally different from Sperling's and, for rather different reasons, equally fail to establish controversial claims about perceptual experience.

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References

1891The Principles of Psychology 1960The information available in brief visual presentations.1995On a confusion about a function of consciousness 2007Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience 2006The Case for Mental Imagery 1997Sound alters visual motion perception 2007Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind 2006Perceptual Experience

Cited by

2015Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing 2018The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness 2017Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes 2022Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value 2023Mental Imagery 2015Block's Overflow Argument 2020The Attending Mind

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