Block's Overflow Argument

Peter Carruthers

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Abstract This article challenges Block's ‘overflow argument’ for the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness and access‐consciousness are distinct. It shows that the data can be explained just as well (or better) in terms of a distinction between contents that are made globally accessible through bottom–up sensory stimulation and those that are sustained and made available in working memory through top‐down attention.

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References

2001The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity 1960The information available in brief visual presentations.1988A cognitive theory of consciousness 1995On a confusion about a function of consciousness 1995Ten Problems of Consciousness 2007Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience 2002The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence 2014Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts

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2018Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access

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