ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

Allan Hazlett

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

Abstract Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1969On Certainty 1979What is Justified Belief?2000Warranted Christian Belief 2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News 1979Justification and Knowledge 1984Justification and truth

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2021The fundamental model of deep disagreements 2018Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism

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