Bureaucratic Morality in the United States

Abstract

This paper argues that the responsible use of administrative discretion is the most fundamental ethical issue for American bureaucrats; more fundamental than such highly visible issues as conflict of interest and financial disclosure. The argument is supported by references to academic literature, examples in administrative practice, and an analysis of the purpose behind the establishment of the Senior Executive Service in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Although the responsible use of administrative discretion is not a problem confined to the United States, the formal separation of powers in the American Constitution gives the problem a peculiarly American orientation. Despite managerial doctrines on "unity of command," American bureaucrats receive conflicting "signals" from competing institutions of government. This problem does not stem from misconduct on the part of anyone, but from the primary legitimating symbol of American politics, the Constitution of the United States. Specific examples of this problem are given from such areas as the EPA Superfund, passive restraints in automobiles and surface mining regulations.

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