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A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
16 references·16 citing·32 second hopsampled
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References

  • 2007Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus7,421 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1981Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts4,568 cited
  • 1994Distributive Politics and Economic Growth4,455 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1993Is Inequality Harmful for Growth2,670 cited
  • 2000Performance Pay and Productivity2,491 cited
  • 1996Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say2,053 cited
  • 1998Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus2,043 cited
  • 1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?2,037 cited
  • 1999Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories1,848 cited
  • 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
  • 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
  • 1987Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems.1,091 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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768 cited

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