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Delegation and firms’ ability to collude
16 references·0 citing·43 second hop
Delegation and firms’ ability to collude (2002)Delegation and firms’ ability to colludeA Primer in Game Theory (1992)A Primer in Game TheoryObservable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation (1991)Observable Contracts: Strateg…Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments (1991)Game-Playing Agents: Unobserv…Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)Delegation and the theory of …Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987)The Strategic Choice of Manag…Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Optimal cartel equilibria wit…Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames (1986)Extremal equilibria of oligop…A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms (1986)A Supergame-Theoretic Model o…Delegation and the Theory of the Firm (1985)Delegation and the Theory of …Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information (1984)Noncooperative Collusion unde…Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly (1984)Equilibrium Incentives in Oli…On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership (1983)On the Stability of Collusive…A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames (1971)A Non-cooperative Equilibrium…The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (1965)International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy (1983)Export subsidies and international market share rivalry (1985)Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test? (1997)The Economic Design of Sporting Contests (2010)Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Richard M. Cyert & James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, 332 s. (1964)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice (1997)Executive compensation (2008)Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information (2011)A Theory of Oligopoly (1964)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger (1983)An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development (1986)Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective (2007)Sticky Prices in the United States (1982)Foreign aid and rent-seeking (2000)The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies (2002)Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s (2004)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)AFFECT- AND COGNITION-BASED TRUST AS FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPERSONAL COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)The effect of within‐industry diversification on firm performance: synergy creation, multi‐market contact and market structuration (2004)Game Theory in Wireless Networks: A Tutorial (2006)Modeling, Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games (2015)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (1986)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition (1993)Explaining Interethnic Cooperation (1996)Economic Analysis of Social Interactions (2000)Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders (1998)Coordinating a socially responsible closed-loop supply chain with product recycling (2017)The Next Generation of Research on IS Use: A Theoretical Framework of Delegation to and from Agentic IS Artifacts (2021)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information2,002 cited
  • 1971A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames1,798 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1986A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms1,177 cited
  • 1987The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives960 cited
  • 1983On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership900 cited
  • 1985Delegation and the Theory of the Firm786 cited
  • 1992A Primer in Game Theory735 cited
  • 1984Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly688 cited
  • 1986Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames674 cited
  • 1989Delegation and the theory of the firm670 cited
  • 1986Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring668 cited
  • 1991Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments376 cited
  • 1991Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation266 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory233 cited

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