From the Theory of Aid Effectiveness to the Practice: The European Commission's Governance Incentive Tranche

Abstract

Around the turn of the millennium a growing consensus emerged on the dos and don'ts of development assistance, based on lessons drawn from failed aid. Donors now increasingly see aid as a leverage to induce or support governance reforms in recipient countries. The EC, which considers itself to be a forerunner of the new aid approach, has recently launched a new instrument to incentivise such reforms: the ‘Governance Incentive Tranche’. However, the evidence presented in this article suggests that, in design and practice, the incentive tranche is surprisingly similar to some of the unsuccessful aid modalities of the past.

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