Alliances between Militant Groups

Abstract

Instrumentally, militant groups should seek to maximize their power against governments by forming alliances. However, studies in bargaining theory predict that alliances between militants would suffer from commitment problems. This study seeks to identify the conditions under which militant groups overcome these acute commitment problems and form alliances. Two game theory models of alliances amongst militants are presented, the first capturing bilateral co-operation, and the second under conditions of asymmetry. It may be concluded that while militants less susceptible to government repression should prefer bilateral alliances, vulnerable militants are more likely to form asymmetric alliances involving state sponsors. Following the theoretical predictions, the theory is tested empirically using the UCDP/PRIO data.

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