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Sum of us
16 references·0 citing·26 second hop
Sum of us (2011)Sum of usIncentive compatible regression learning (2010)Incentive compatible regressi…Cambridge University Press, 1696–1712 (2010)Cambridge University Press, 1…Tighter Bounds for Facility Games (2009)Tighter Bounds for Facility G…Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)Approximate mechanism design …Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) (2007)Introduction to Mechanism Des…Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (2006)Truthful randomized mechanism…Competitive auctions (2006)Competitive auctionsSybilproof reputation mechanisms (2005)Sybilproof reputation mechani…Competitive generalized auctions (2002)Competitive generalized aucti…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignManipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance (1977)Manipulation of Schemes that …Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Optimal Auction Design (1981)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games (2010)Beyond dominant resource fairness (2012)Computational Social Choice (2012)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Approval Voting (1978)House Allocation with Existing Tenants (1999)When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? (2007)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions (2009)Optimal social choice functions: A utilitarian view (2015)Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2016)Different perspectives on information systems: problems and solutions (1987)The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics (2006)Racism as Disrespect (2009)
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References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 1977Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance443 cited
  • 2010Cambridge University Press, 1696–1712405 cited
  • 2009Approximate mechanism design without money331 cited
  • 2007Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)300 cited
  • 2005Sybilproof reputation mechanisms274 cited
  • 2006Competitive auctions191 cited
  • 2006Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions189 cited
  • 2002Competitive generalized auctions155 cited
  • 2010Incentive compatible regression learning138 cited
  • 2009Tighter Bounds for Facility Games111 cited

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