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Bayesian personalism, the methodology of scientific research programmes, and Duhem's problem
0 references·16 citing·46 second hop
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  • 1997Duhem's Problem, the Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or “What's Belief Got to Do with It?”54 cited
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  • 2008The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem's Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation39 cited
  • 2009Rational Inference: Deductive, Inductive and Probabilistic Thinking34 cited
  • 1983Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?31 cited

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  • 2014Improving the Meta-Analytic Assessment of Effect Size Variance With an Informed Bayesian Prior31 cited