Can Cross-Border Bargaining Coordination Work? Analytical Reflections and Evidence from the Metal Industry in Germany and Austria

Abstract

To contain downward pressures on labour standards, Europe's unions have attempted to coordinate their bargaining strategies. Little is known about whether such coordination can actually work. Analytical accounts have deduced its feasibility from national experiences with decentralized forms of coordination, while empirically only anecdotal evidence on its effectiveness is available. This article contributes to the analytical debate by pointing out the different logics of national and transnational bargaining coordination. Empirically, it tests the prospects for cross-border coordination by analyzing how Austrian collective agreements in the metal industry related to their German counterparts from 1969 to 2003. We conclude by discussing the implications for EU-level bargaining coordination.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 40 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.