A `Managerial' Model of the Trade Union

Abstract

This paper criticizes the main existing models of the trade union for assuming that union objectives are coterminous with those of union me mbers, thus neglecting the role of the union leadership. The discussi on is related to traditional controversies about whether unions shoul d be seen as "economic" or "political" institutions. A "managerial" model is developed in which overall union objectives are influen ced by both the union's leadership and its membership. The properties of this "political" model are shown to be similar to existing "ec onomic" models. This suggests that recent work on trade unions is mor e broadly based than previously supposed, and that some of the tradit ional controversies about union objectives were misleading. The model is then used to analyze some economic effects of intraunion conflict ts. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

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