SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise
16 references·10 citing·43 second hop
Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise (2011)Scoring Rules and Epistemic CompromiseSubjective Probabilities should be Sharp (2010)Subjective Probabilities shou…Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence (2010)Peer Disagreement and Higher‐…If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (2009)If You're an Egalitarian, How…Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…Reflection and Disagreement (2007)Reflection and DisagreementEpistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Epistemology of Disagreement:…Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility (2006)Justifying Conditionalization…How Probabilities Reflect Evidence (2005)How Probabilities Reflect Evi…Beyond "justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation (2005)Beyond "justification": dimen…Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (2000)Papers in Metaphysics and Epi…A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Decision Theory as Philosophy (1996)Decision Theory as PhilosophyCombining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography (1986)Combining Probability Distrib…Conditionalization and observation (1973)Conditionalization and observ…Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations (1971)Elicitation of Personal Proba…Rational Decisions (1952)Rational DecisionsReasons for Reliabilism (2021)Reasons for ReliabilismUnsettled Thoughts (2019)Unsettled ThoughtsOn the Accuracy of Group Credences (2019)On the Accuracy of Group Cred…How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning? (2019)How Do Beliefs Simplify Reaso…WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE? (2018)WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy (2016)Updating on the Credences of …The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences (2015)The Accuracy and Rationality …Groupthink (2014)GroupthinkDisagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise (2014)Disagreement and Epistemic Ut…Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry (2007)Fallibilism and the Aim of In…The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. (1995)Warranted Christian Belief (2000)Epistemic Permissiveness (2005)Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine (1953)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Measuring Expectations (2004)Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation (2007)Can there be vague objects? (1978)The Problem of the Many (1980)The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter (2003)What's So Bad About Overdetermination? (2003)Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts (2005)Coherence and the axioms of confirmation (1955)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility (2006)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty. (1969)Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. (1994)Combining Probability Distributions From Experts in Risk Analysis (1999)Trust Management for the Semantic Web (2003)Probabilistic Forecasting (2014)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)Fake News and Partisan Epistemology (2017)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)Betting on Theories (1993)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat (2014)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification (2010)Verbal Disputes (2011)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models (2007)Probabilistic Forecasts, Calibration and Sharpness (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1971Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations1,228 cited
  • 1986Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography1,007 cited
  • 2007Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News984 cited
  • 1952Rational Decisions975 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2007Reflection and Disagreement660 cited
  • 2010Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence580 cited
  • 2005Beyond "justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation485 cited
  • 1996Decision Theory as Philosophy459 cited
  • 2000Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology459 cited
  • 2006Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility385 cited
  • 1973Conditionalization and observation359 cited
  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 2009If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?281 cited
  • 2005How Probabilities Reflect Evidence239 cited
  • 2010Subjective Probabilities should be Sharp210 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Cited by

  • 2019Unsettled Thoughts48 cited
  • 2016Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy47 cited
  • 2019How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?45 cited
  • 2007Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry42 cited
  • 2018WHAT IS JUSTIFIED CREDENCE?42 cited
  • 2014Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise41 cited
  • 2014Groupthink40 cited
  • 2021Reasons for Reliabilism38 cited
  • 2015The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences33 cited
  • 2019On the Accuracy of Group Credences28 cited