Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

Timothy N. Cason · Lata Gangadharan

64 citations0/0 files storedExperimental Economics

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to the effectiveness of this decentralized enforcement mechanism in two nonlinear social dilemma games: a piecewise linear public good game and a common pool resource game. While peer punishment improves cooperation in these new environments, the impact of punishment is weaker and takes longer to be effective. This appears to be due to the greater complexity of the nonlinear settings, which makes socially optimal choices more difficult to identify.

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References

1990Governing the Commons 1992Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments 1994Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible 2010Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature 1986The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.

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