This commentary addresses ethnographic and theoretical problems in the recent debate over lineages and houses in Classic Maya society. On the one hand, proponents of segmentary lineage models miss ambiguities between filiation and descent, residential and corporate groups in the Maya ethnographies they use for their analogies. On the other hand, supporters of Lévi-Strauss's house model fail to appreciate the relative instead of absolute differences between descent theory and alliance theory that underlie lineage and house models and make it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between them archaeologically. Both look to descriptive, largely static types derived from elsewhere and then argue which best fits Classic Maya society rather than build models that define the relevant components of social organization—filiation, descent, alliance, residence—and then theorize how differently patterned relations between these components might yield the institutional groupings we find on (or in the case of archaeology, in) the ground.
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