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The Wrong Kind of Reason
0 references·16 citing·47 second hopsampled
The Wrong Kind of Reason (2005)The Wrong Kind of ReasonThe Fundamentality of Fit (2019)The Fundamentality of FitEqual treatment for belief (2018)Equal treatment for beliefA Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief (2018)A Combinatorial Argument agai…The right and the wrong kind of reasons (2017)The right and the wrong kind …In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief (2016)In Defense of Practical Reaso…Fittingness First (2016)Fittingness FirstReasons as Premises of Good Reasoning (2015)Reasons as Premises of Good R…Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason (2012)Transmission and the Wrong Ki…The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons (2012)The Ubiquity of State-Given R…Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (2011)Stakes, withholding, and prag…Exercising Doxastic Freedom (2011)Exercising Doxastic FreedomTruly Understood (2008)Truly UnderstoodThe reasons of trust (2008)The reasons of trustThe possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem (2008)The possibility of pragmatic …Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason (2008)Defending the wide-scope appr…Entitlement and rationality (2007)Entitlement and rationalityAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge (2003)The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY AND DOXASTIC AGENCY (2013)Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation (2017)The Mismeasure of the Self (2021)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions (2000)Reasons First (2021)On Certainty (1969)Elusive knowledge (1996)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic (2007)Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing (2011)Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity (2016)Deciding to believe (1973)The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1988)Slaves of the Passions (2007)KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2005)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment (2017)Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters (2018)Varieties of Moral Encroachment (2020)Trust and Antitrust (1986)The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (1990)Trust as an Affective Attitude (1996)Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account (2014)The attitude of trust is basic (2015)Trust influencing factors in main contractor and subcontractor relationships during projects (2015)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. (1988)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)Opting for the Best (2019)The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View* (2019)Inquiry and the epistemic (2021)The Possibility of Altruism (1979)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Can Pragmatists Be Moderate? (2020)The Game of Belief (2020)Getting Things Right (2022)Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture (1994)Normative Requirements (1999)Internal and External Reasons (2008)What is Reasoning? (2017)Fittingness (2018)Ethics Without Principles (2004)Normative reasons as good bases (2015)
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  • 2015Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning294 cited
  • 2012Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason274 cited
  • 2012The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons274 cited
  • 2008The reasons of trust250 cited
  • 2011Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge222 cited
  • 2016Fittingness First211 cited
  • 2011Exercising Doxastic Freedom181 cited
  • 2007Entitlement and rationality180 cited
  • 2018Equal treatment for belief154 cited
  • 2018A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief150 cited
  • 2008The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem148 cited
  • 2019The Fundamentality of Fit147 cited
  • 2016In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief145 cited
  • 2008Truly Understood145 cited
  • 2017The right and the wrong kind of reasons137 cited
  • 2008Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason126 cited

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