The Mismeasure of the Self

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this book is to offer detailed characterizations of some intellectual virtues and vices of self-evaluation, to highlight the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from them, to explain their psychological bases and to suggest that some interventions that inhibit vicious behaviour and promote intellectual virtue. The first chapter introduces the virtues and vices of intellectual self-evaluation that are the main topic of the book. The second chapter offers a detailed account of three kinds of intellectual vices: character traits, thinking styles, and sensibilities. The chapter includes a defence of the view that motivations play a crucial role in the development and preservation of these psychological features. The third chapter introduces attitude psychology which supplies the framework for detailed accounts of virtue and vices. These accounts are provided in Chapters 4–6. Chapter 4 discusses humility, pride, and concern for one’s intellectual reputation. Chapter 5 details superbia, arrogance, servility, and self-abasement. Chapter 6 is dedicated to vanity, narcissism, timidity, and fatalism. Chapter 7 analyses the epistemic harms and moral wrongs that flow from these intellectual vices. Chapter 8 argues individuals are morally and epistemically responsible for their epistemic vices and the bad believing that flows from them, but raises questions about the wisdom and morality of blaming people for these psychological features. Finally, Chapter 9 evaluates some interventions designed to promote virtue and reduce vice.

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