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Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach
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References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1953Social Choice and Individual Values.1,534 cited
  • 2004Three brief proofs of Arrow?s Impossibility Theorem270 cited
  • 1977The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness251 cited
  • 1983The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey223 cited

Cited by

  • 2012Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory173 cited
  • 2004The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules103 cited
  • 2011Strategyproof Social Choice100 cited
  • 2012A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one79 cited
  • 2008Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences70 cited
  • 2001Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem67 cited
  • 2005Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity59 cited
  • 2014Financial Engineering and the Arms Race Between Accounting Standard Setters and Preparers

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49 cited
  • 2019Environmental Law and Economic. Theory and Practice35 cited