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We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer in the upstream and two competing retailers in the downstream. The retailers sell differentiated goods and are endowed with some private demand information. The paper shows that the manufacturer's optimal strategy is independent of the type of downstream competition, Cournot or Bertrand, and that no information will be shared with the manufacturer on a voluntary basis. However, complete information sharing, which benefits all three parties, can be achieved through side payment when the retailers' information is statistically less accurate or when the leakage effect is more beneficial to the retailers.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 323 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.