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Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers
16 references·0 citing·42 second hop
Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers (2002)Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of t…CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM (1997)CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICA…Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence (1995)Two Fallacies Concerning Cent…Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (1995)Partisan Politics, Divided Go…Optimal contracts for central bankers (1995)Optimal contracts for central…Central-Bank Independence Revisited (1995)Central-Bank Independence Rev…Policy Games: Coordination and Independence in Monetary and Fiscal Policies (1994)Policy Games: Coordination an…Designing institutions for monetary stability (1993)Designing institutions for mo…Independent Currency Authorities (1992)Independent Currency Authorit…RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES (1987)RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NON…Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information (1986)Reputation in a Model of Mone…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements (1985)Multimarket Oligopoly: Strate…Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information (1984)Monetary Policy Games and the…Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Rules, discretion and reputat…On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy (1978)On the Time Consistency of Op…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…Long-term contracting, sticky prices, and monetary policy (1977)Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1977)The Unstable EMS (1993)The Gold Standard as a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” (1996)Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals (2001)Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence (1995)Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It? (1999)Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint (2003)An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money (1958)Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization (1973)A Guide to Public Sector Debt and Deficits (1985)Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations* *I have greatly benefited from comments received at Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, the Macro Lunch Group of the University of Pennsylvania, MIT, and the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. I am particularly indebted to Matt Canzoneri, Sara Guerschanik-Calvo, Joseph Harrington, Jr, Elhanan Helpman, Nissan Leviatan, Maury Obstfeld, Assaf Razin, Sweder van Wijnbergen and two anonymous referees. The research on this paper was partly done while I was a visiting scholar at the Research Department of the Internationed Monetary Fund, and it was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. However, any opinions expressed are entirely my own and not those of any of the above institutions. This paper has already been published in the The American Economic Review, 78, 4, September 1988, pp. 647–661. (1989)A Toolkit for Analysing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily (2001)Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent (1986)Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models (1988)The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development (1993)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment (1973)Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies (1991)Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism (1995)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. (1973)Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts (1980)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model (1983)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY (2005)Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence (1995)T HEORIES OF D ELEGATION (2001)Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union (2008)Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy? (1997)Central Banking in Theory and Practice (1998)Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia (1999)Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996 (2000)Setting the Agenda (2005)Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy3,625 cited
  • 1985Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements2,526 cited
  • 1995Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy1,202 cited
  • 1995Optimal contracts for central bankers1,131 cited
  • 1978On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy807 cited
  • 1993Designing institutions for monetary stability573 cited
  • 1984Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information440 cited
  • 1995Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence408 cited
  • 1987RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES401 cited
  • 1995Central-Bank Independence Revisited245 cited
  • 1994Policy Games: Coordination and Independence in Monetary and Fiscal Policies142 cited
  • 1986Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information134 cited
  • 1997CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM80 cited

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1992
Independent Currency Authorities
80 cited

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