References

• 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,896 cited
• 2007Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus7,421 cited
• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 1981The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance3,652 cited
• 1982Reputation and imperfect information3,093 cited
• 1982Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence1,850 cited
• 1989Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets1,627 cited
• 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information1,287 cited
• 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
• 1983Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics.1,065 cited
• 2001Markov Perfect Equilibrium809 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 2008A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem719 cited
• 2006Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships674 cited
• 1991Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships317 cited
• 1992