References

• 1996Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem1,063 cited
• 1982Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems913 cited
• 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
• 1998Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting725 cited
• 1995The Swing Voter's Curse650 cited
• 1997Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information607 cited
• 1986Multistage Games with Communication588 cited
• 1981Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding500 cited
• 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design408 cited
• 2000Information Acquisition in Auctions364 cited
• 2002Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design331 cited
• 2003Committee Design with Endogenous Information316 cited
• 1998Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents229 cited
• 2000Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections212 cited
• 2005Would rational voters acquire costly information?205 cited