Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting

Yuga J. Cohler · John K. Lai · David C. Parkes · Ariel D. Procaccia

91 citations0/0 files storedProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization Optimization and Search Problems

Abstract

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envy-free allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of the agents. Our goal is to pinpoint the most efficient allocations among all envy-free allocations. We provide tractable algorithms for doing so under different assumptions regarding the preferences of the agents.

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1998Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution.2004On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods 1948The problem of fair division 1959Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method 1961How to Cut A Cake Fairly 2000Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair if You Can.2009Approximate mechanism design without money 1999Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division

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