References

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• 2014Combinatorial Auctions923 cited
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• 2006Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation212 cited
• 2002Chapter 5 Implementation theory185 cited
• 2005Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains169 cited
• 2001Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids132 cited
• 2003Characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols: price-oriented, rationing-free protocol78 cited
• 2007Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity76 cited
• 2005Mechanism design for single-value domains39 cited

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