Monotonicity and Implementability

Itai Ashlagi A · Mark Braverman · Avinatan Hassidim · Dov Monderer

92 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

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References

1981Optimal Auction Design 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions 1987A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 1979Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains 1996How (not) to sell nuclear weapons

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