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Monotonicity and Implementability
16 references·3 citing·40 second hop
Monotonicity and Implementability (2010)Monotonicity and ImplementabilityMechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach (2011)Mechanism Design: A Linear Pr…Frugal path mechanisms (2007)Frugal path mechanismsWeak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006)Weak Monotonicity Characteriz…Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains (2005)Weak monotonicity suffices fo…Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Towards a characterization of…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (2001)Efficient Design with Interde…Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design (2001)Convex Potentials with an App…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignTruth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Ap…How (not) to sell nuclear weapons (1996)How (not) to sell nuclear wea…A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context (1987)A necessary and sufficient co…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignThe Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility (1979)The Implementation of Social …Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains (1979)Groves' Scheme on Restricted …The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness (1977)The equivalence of strong pos…TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS (2018)TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE …General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis (2014)General Truthfulness Characte…A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms (2012)A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Trut…Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)The Winner-Take-All Society (1996)Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities (1999)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment (2007)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (1980)Optimal decision-making with minimal waste (2006)Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals (2008)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984)Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2005)The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2010)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Course in Game Theory (1994)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (1982)Chapter 22 Social choice theory (1986)Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation (2005)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design (2002)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders (2005)On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing (2005)Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms (2007)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Delegation and the theory of the firm (1989)The Possibility of Social Choice (1999)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 1979The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility809 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 1987A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context486 cited
  • 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations483 cited
  • 1979Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains413 cited
  • 1996How (not) to sell nuclear weapons344 cited
  • 1977The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness251 cited
  • 2004Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions233 cited
  • 1999Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions223 cited
  • 2006Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation212 cited
  • 2011Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach194 cited
  • 2005Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains169 cited
  • 2001Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design140 cited

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2007
Frugal path mechanisms
101 cited

Cited by

  • 2012A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms84 cited
  • 2014General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis39 cited
  • 2018TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS21 cited