Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal—subpersonal distinction

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that the distinction between System 1 and System 2 corresponds to that between subpersonal and personal reasoning. But even if the distinctions do not align in this way, a weaker claim still stands. The distinction between personal and subpersonal reasoning marks one broad binary division in human reasoning, and one that needs to be acknowledged in psychological theory. Indeed, it may be the only such division. Most dual-systems theorists accept that System 1 is actually a suite of systems, and several contributors suggest that System 2 may also fragment in various ways. Indeed, there could be hybrid systems at a subpersonal level, with some System 1 properties and some System 2 properties. Personal reasoning, on the other hand, constitutes a distinct level of mental activity, which can be clearly distinguished from the lower, subpersonal one.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 146 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.