Is There a Cogent Philosophical Argument against Competency Standards?

Abstract

In Australia and elsewhere, a sometimes heated debate is taking place about the significance for higher education of the adoption of competency standards by professions and other occupations. To many in the higher education sector, it is self-evident that competency standards cannot do justice to the professional aspects of an occupation. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that this conclusion is too hasty. There are various ways of conceptualising occupational competence. The paper argues that one of them does do justice to the variety and richness of the professional aspects of job performance. This conception of competence is shown to meet the more considered objections to competency standards in the philosophical literature, as well as various less well-articulated criticisms that have appeared in recent debate in Australia. The implications of this richer conception of competence for higher education are discussed.

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