SELF-COMMAND IN ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS

Abstract

Building on an analysis of Adam Smith's enumeration of five classes of passions, we show that self-command in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) can be modeled as a game whose structure is identical to endogenous quality or reputation models. While acknowledging Smith's views on the evolutive nature of the general rules of morality (as well as the individual's understanding of them), we take the general rules as given. Within the game's framework we show how self-command can be attained in equilibrium solely due to the `internal reputation effect' arising from one's self-interested behavior. Our game-theoretic reinterpretation of TMS sheds new light on the acquisition of self-command and casts Smith as a sophisticated early theorist: he had already dealt with the issue of reputational enforcement, and wrestled with the same tension that has led to the eductive and evolutive approaches to non-cooperative game theory.

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