THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Martín Sefton · Robert Shupp · James M. Walker

649 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero‐sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JELC92)

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 649 citations exist upstream.

References

1990Governing the Commons 1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 1995Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History 2000ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition 2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2005A theory of reciprocity 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible

Cited by

2017Statistical physics of human cooperation 2013Human cooperation 2011Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.2008Winners don’t punish 2009Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation 2007Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?2011The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.