On Licensing Under Bertrand Competition

X. H. Wang

115 citations0/0 files storedAustralian Economic Papers

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Merger and Competition Analysis Intellectual Property and Patents Digital Platforms and Economics

Abstract

This paper considers licensing by an innovating firm to its competitor in a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition. A principal finding is that royalty licensing may be superior to fee licensing for the innovating firm both when the innovation is drastic and when the innovation is non‐drastic.

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