TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER UNDER RETURNS TO SCALE*

Debapriya Sen · Giorgos Stamatopoulos

17 citations0/0 files storedManchester School

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Intellectual Property and Patents Merger and Competition Analysis Digital Platforms and Economics

Abstract

In this paper we consider the licensing of a cost‐reducing innovation by an outside innovator that uses optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties in a Cournot duopoly characterized by non‐constant returns to scale. The main conclusion of our theoretical analysis is that incidence of positive royalties and diffusion of innovations are both inversely related to economies of scale. Our analysis provides a plausible explanation of the variation of licensing policies across industries.

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References

1962Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention 1972Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention 1986Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent 1985On the Licensing of Innovations 2000The Structure of Licensing Contracts 1986How to License Intangible Property 1990Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information 1998Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model

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2013Licensing under convex costs 2022Patent Licensing and Capacity in a Cournot Model 2012Technology licensing under optimal tax policy

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