European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire

Abstract

The eu's conditions for the central and east European applicants look deceptively straightforward: they comprise stable democracy, a competitive market economy, and the capacity to implement eu laws and policies (the so called acquis communautaire). However, they are very general and not amenable to quantitative assessment, leaving ambiguity about exactly when they have been met. This ambiguity increases the eu's power in accession negotiations, but the accompanying uncertainty diffuses its influence in shaping institutional and policy choices. This article examines the eu's accession conditionality levers and the constraints on their use. It concludes that readiness for membership depends not only on technical progress in negotiations, but also on when the current member-states are politically ready for enlargement.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 219 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.