Emotional Hazard in a Power‐to‐Take Experiment

Ronald Bosman · Frans A. A. M. van Winden

376 citations0/0 files storedThe Economic Journal

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Social Power and Status Dynamics

Abstract

In this experimental study of a two player power‐to‐take game, players earn an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game has two stages. First, one player can claim any part of the other’s income (take rate). Then, the latter player can respond by destroying own income. We focus on how emotions influence responses and show: (1) a higher take rate increases (decreases) intensity of negative (positive) emotions; (2) negative emotions drive destruction; (3) at high emotional intensity, responders destroy everything; (4) expectations affect the probability of punishment. Emotional hazard is identified as a new source of efficiency costs.

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References

1988Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 1991Emotion And Adaptation 1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 1997Affective Computing 1988The Cognitive Structure of Emotions 1980Toward a positive theory of consumer choice 2000ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition 2011Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics

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