The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring

Johannes Hörner · Wojciech Olszewski

105 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

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References

1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information 1964A Theory of Oligopoly 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1998Private Observation, Communication and Collusion 1998Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring 2002A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma

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2011Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices 2009Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play 2007Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production 2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 2012Cooperation with Network Monitoring 2008Folk theorem with communication

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