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The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring

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References

1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information2,002 cited
1964A Theory of Oligopoly1,817 cited
1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
1998Private Observation, Communication and Collusion334 cited
1998Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring254 cited
2002A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma219 cited
1986Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting192 cited
2002Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring175 cited
2002The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring169 cited
2002Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring156 cited
1997Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring146 cited
2005Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games142 cited

Cited by

2011Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices

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167 cited

2009Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play129 cited

2007Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production97 cited

2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring88 cited

2012Cooperation with Network Monitoring67 cited

2008Folk theorem with communication62 cited

2011Cutting in Line: Social Norms in Queues43 cited

2007Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring42 cited

2010Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring37 cited

n.d.The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs36 cited

2006Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring35 cited

2019Cooperation and Community Responsibility34 cited