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Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring · Study

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ArticleRepeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath2002

OA

Articlegreen2002

Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath · Stephen Edward Morris

156 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

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References

1994A Course in Game Theory 1989Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics 1984Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1986Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames 1994Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching 1998Private Observation, Communication and Collusion

Cited by

2005Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 2006The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring 2002Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 2006Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 2007Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps 2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

2002Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoringarticle · 7 shared references 2006The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoringarticle · 7 shared references 2002The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoringarticle · 6 shared references 2004Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Playersarticle · 6 shared references 2002Moral Hazard and Private Monitoringarticle · 6 shared references 2004Collusion and Price Rigidityarticle · 5 shared references

Details

Year2002

Typearticle

Published2002-01-01

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations156

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

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doi10.1006/jeth.2001.2869

openalex_workW2160685394

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2004Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

2010A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification