Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

Michihiro Kandori · Ichiro Obara

98 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has focused on public strategies: strategies that depend solely on the history of publicly observable signals. This paper sheds light on the role of private strategies: strategies that depend not only on public signals, but also on players' own actions in the past. Our main finding is that players can sometimes make better use of information by using private strategies and that efficiency in repeated games can be improved. Our equilibrium private strategy for repeated prisoners' dilemma games consists of two states and has the property that each player's optimal strategy is independent of the other player's state.

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References

1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1991Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships 2002A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 2002Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 2002The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring 1986An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria 2002Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

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2007Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production 2021Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 2004Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players 2005Private monitoring in auctions 2004Finite memory and imperfect monitoring 2020Asymmetric Information, Reputation, and Welfare in Online Credit Markets

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