Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets

Daron Acemoğlu · Jörn‐Steffen Pischke

210 citations0/0 files storedNational Bureau of Economic Research

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Labor market dynamics and wage inequality Global trade and economics Education and Labor Relations

Abstract

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

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