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Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986

406 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Political Influence and Corporate Strategies Electoral Systems and Political Participation Corruption and Economic Development

Abstract

This paper treats the market for special-interest campaign contributions and political "favors" as a simple asset market. The model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables: the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives, the monetary value of the favors he has promised, and his probability of winning. Using data on open-seat races for the U.S. House of Representatives, I confront the model with a series of tests. Despite the starkness of the model, the results of these tests are highly supportive.

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1994Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters 1998Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables 2009Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities*1992Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often 2011Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942–2008 2013The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors 1997Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California’s state legislative races 2000Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

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