Article2001

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

54 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Behavioral Decision Making

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Both social cooperation and self-control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self-control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma-like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self-control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit-for-tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self-control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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References

1981The Evolution of Cooperation 1976The Selfish Gene 1953Science and Human Behavior 1954Science and Human Behavior.1965Prisoner's Dilemma 1965Prisoner's Dilemma 1992Picoeconomics: The Strategic Interaction of Successive Motivational States within the Person 1995Self-control: Beyond commitment

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